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1 Introduction
Rapid growth of non-monetary transactions has been one of the most strik-
ing features of Russia’s transition to a market economy. Russian economy
is highly demonetized. Barter and vecksels (…rms’ IOUs) have become ma-
jor means of payment after the …nancial stabilization of 1995. According to
various sources, barter accounts for 30 to 70 per cent of inter-…rm transac-
tions (Aukutzionek (1998), Karpov (1997), Hendley et al. (1998)). Data on
vecksels are scarce but some estimates indicate that they account for 10-20
per cent of inter-…rm transactions with total volume being as large as 10 per
cent GDP (Voitkova (1999)).1
Demonetization of this depth is unprecedented in modern economies.2
The mainstream economic theory of money has explained why barter is
crowded out by …at money in all developed economies. Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), Williamson and Wright (1994), Banerjee and Maskin (1996) build
general equilibrium models with asymmetric information and/or random
matching to show that introduction of a universal medium of exchange can
increase welfare. The literature considers money to be a superior mode of
exchange. The growth of barter in Russia is therefore a challenge to modern
economics: it is barter that crowds out the monetary exchange.3
There is a number of competing theories that suggest solutions to the
puzzle. The most common one explains the prevalence of barter by the liq-
uidity squeeze due to tight monetary policy. This view is maintained by most
…rm managers. The second explanation is often brought up by government
1The estimates from di¤erent survey vary a lot. Each survey includes several hundred
…rms and may well be biased (there are about 16 thousand large and medium size industrial
…rms in Russia). In the data from IET surveys we use in this paper, 40 per cent of sales
are paid in kind and 10 per cent are paid in wechsels. The o¢cial data come from …rms’
…nancial accounts. These data may be even more distorted because of di¤erent prices
used in monetary and barter transactions. Our calculations using these data for 1996-98
provide an estimate of the average share of money in sales revenues of 49-52% in 1996-98
with the median being as low as 32-37%.
2Although barter trade has been growing in OECD economies, it is still negligible.
According to IRTA (1998), barter exchanges between North American companies in 1998
are estimated at 13 bln dollars which is at least ten times less in absolute terms than in
Russian economy (and Russian economy in 1996 was roughly 15 times smaller than the
US one).
3Banerjee and Maskin (1996) suggest that barter may prevail in equilibrium when
in‡ation is very high. In Russia, however, the growth of barter was observed after in‡ation
was brought down.
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o¢cials who say that barter is used by the managers to avoid paying taxes in
full. Third, outside investors often claim that managers use barter to divert
pro…ts, entrench and delay restructuring. Ellingsen (1998) and Marin and
Schnitzer (1999) have suggested that barter in Russia may have emerged as
a response to contractual imperfections. Ellingsen (1998) builds a model in
which liquidity-constrained agents signal their type via payments in kind.
Marin and Schnitzer (1999) assume that barter helps to enforce debt con-
tracts since barter can be used as a hostage. Thus, in their model, barter
facilitates exchange between liquidity constrained …rms in an environment
with costly contracting. Gaddy and Ickes (1998a) suggest that barter is a
substitute for restructuring. In their model, managers can invest either in
’relational’ capital which facilitates barter within existing trading networks
or into ’restructuring’ which helps their …rms produce goods competitive in
the new markets. This implies a negative relationship between growth of
barter and restructuring. Woodru¤ (1999) argues that demonetization is a
political phenomenon. Russian government lost the battle to regional govern-
ments and large …rms who have successfully challenged the federal monopoly
to issue money.
We believe that analysis of barter in Russia is incomplete without taking
into account the role of market structure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
these are the natural monopolies that are most engaged in barter (Gaddy
and Ickes (1998b)). In 1996-97, Gazprom (the natural gas monopoly) and
Uni…ed Energy Systems (the electricity monopoly) reported cash receipts of
as low as 15-20 per cent total revenue (Pinto et al. (1999)). The rest of their
revenues came in vecksels, coal, metal, machinery and even jet …ghters. It
is also interesting that all case studies discussed in Woodru¤ (1999) refer to
…rms that are either national or regional natural monopolies.
In this paper, we build a model of barter as a means of price discrimination
that predicts a positive relationship between concentration of market power
and share of barter in sales. In addition to non-linear pricing, sellers can o¤er
contracts with payments in kind. Since quality of the buyer’s output is better
known to the buyer than to the seller, the seller can use barter contracts as
a screening device. The buyers who produce output of high quality prefer to
keep it and pay in cash while the buyers with low quality output keep cash
and pay in kind. Even in the presence of the adverse selection, sellers may
prefer to use barter. Indeed, if there were no barter, some buyers would buy
too little (imperfect competition is ine¢cient). Barter allows to sell to such
customers and may therefore be pro…table for the sellers.
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Our argument suggests that barter in Russia may be similar to barter in
other economies. As shown in Caves (1974) and Caves and Marin (1992),
price discrimination is responsible for the wide use of countertrade in trade
between OECD and less developed countries.4 Our model is di¤erent from
one in Caves (1974) in several respects. First, we build a closed model of
an imperfectly competitive industry (rather than a monopoly) and solve for
partial equilibria taking into account responses of all sellers and buyers in
the market. Second, there is an important distinction between international
and domestic barter. In the international trade, it is usually possible to sep-
arate markets so that …rst- or third-degree price discrimination can be used.
In domestic sales, there is a single market and only incentive-compatible
discrimination is feasible. This is crucial for our analysis: self-selection is re-
sponsible for emergence of the ’cash demand externality’ which in turn results
in multiplicity of equilibria. If …rm A sells more for cash, the cash prices go
down which the most productive customers among those who used to pay in
kind. With these customers leaving the barter economy, the average quality
of in-kind payments deteriorates and A’s competitors have more incentives
to sell for cash. The multiplicity of equilibria may explain why barter is used
for price discrimination in Russia but not in other countries.5
The main implication of our analysis is that barter can indeed emerge in
equilibrium as a means of price discrimination even if there are no liquidity
constraints. Our model predicts that barter is more likely to occur in con-
centrated industries and decreases with competition. Moreover, there is a
structural break in the strength of the e¤ect: at certain level of competition
the industry jumps from high-barter equilibrium to low-barter equilibrium.
These predictions are empirically testable. We use a survey of Russian …rms
in order to check whether our model is consistent with data.
Recent empirical literature on barter in Russia can be roughly divided
into two groups according to the empirical methodology used. The …rst
approach is to ask managers how much they barter and why they barter and
try to regress their answers on their perceptions of their …rms’ characteristics
such as indebtedness, competitiveness, access to markets etc. The second
4See also Ellingsen and Stole (1996) who suggest that international barter may be a
device to commit not to engage in unilateral imports. Magenheim and Murrell (1988)
put forward yet another reason to use barter for price discrimination: in a repeated game,
barter helps not to reveal the seller’s type to future customers.
5The nature of multiplicity of equilibria in our model is di¤erent from Kranton (1996)
and Polterovich (1998) where multiplicity emerges due to the thin market externality.
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approach is to match the manager’s estimates of share of barter in sales
with …nancial accounts of their …rms. So in both approaches, the managers
provide information on how much they barter. The di¤erence between the
approaches is in the source of information on why they barter. The …rst
approach uses the manager’s perceptions while the second one relies on o¢cial
statistics. The …rst approach may therefore provide a biased view due to
managers’ imperfect information on their counterparts and competitors and
lack of incentives to reveal sensitive information. The second approach gets
rid of this bias but is subject to other limitations. There are no o¢cial data
that allow to estimate some important variables especially those related to
the informal economy.
The …rst approach is used in Commander and Mumssen (1998) (who use
the second approach as well), Carlin et al. (2000), Brana and Maurel (1999),
Marin and Schnitzer (1999). Commander and Mummsen (1998) …nd that
barter is related to …nancial di¢culties. Tax evasion and corporate gover-
nance problems are not reported by managers as primary causes of barter.
Brana and Maurel (1999) use panel data to show that the explanations of
barter are di¤erent for indebted and non-indebted …rms. Potentially viable
…rms use barter to relax liquidity constraints while highly indebted …rms
take advantage of barter to avoid restructuring. Carlin et al. (2000) …nd
that barter helps to overcome disorganization which is consistent with Marin
and Schnitzer (1999) who use data on barter prices and …nd support for
their model that barter serves as a hostage to restore trust among liquidity-
constrained trading parties. The second approach is used in Guriev and Ickes
(2000) to test whether share of barter in payments for inputs depends on the
…rm’s cash holdings. Unlike the authors using the …rst methodology, Guriev
and Ickes (2000) …nd no signi…cant relationship.6
In this paper, we apply the second approach. Unlike Carlin et al. (2000)
and Caves and Marin (1992), we measure competition directly through con-
centration ratios rather than via managers’ perception of competition.7 We
6This result emphasizes the danger of bias produced by the …rst approach. Indeed,
if …rm A says that …rm B pays A in kind because B has no money, A may be mislead
since A does not have complete information on B’s …nancial standing. Moreover, if B
knows that A accepts barter, B will not need money, so that the lack of liquidity may
be endogenous. See Guriev and Ickes (2000) for a detailed discussion. It is interesting
that when Commander and Mumssen (1998) use the second approach (p. 27), they also
…nd no signi…cant relationship between barter and …nancial variables (access to credit and
overdue payables).
7Caves and Marin (1992) asked …rms whether they face little or substantial competition
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…nd that barter is indeed correlated with concentration. We also test for a
structural break and show that it is indeed present in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build a
model of a price-discriminating monopoly that can use barter. The model
is then extended to the case of oligopoly. Section 3 contains results of our
empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
In this Section we study a simple model of barter as a screening device for
price discrimination. In Subsection 2.1 we start with a standard model of a
monopoly that sells to a continuum of buyers. We introduce notation and
make technical assumptions. In Subsection 2.2, we add barter. In Subsection
2.3, we extend the analysis for the case of oligopoly and solve for Cournot
equilibria.
2.1 The setting
Consider a monopoly seller S that supplies an input to a continuum of buyers
B (industrial …rms). The marginal cost of production of the input is constant
and equal to c 2 [0; 1]. Each buyer has a linear technology which converts a
unit of the input into one unit of output worth v to the buyer. The buyer’s
maximum capacity is one unit. The input cannot be resold by one buyer
to another buyer: once purchased, it can only be used in production.8 The
buyer’s outside option is zero so that buyers add value whenever v > c and
destroy value if v < c:
We assume that v is distributed on [0; 1] with a c.d.f. F (v). The buyer’s
productivity v is her private information, but the distribution function F (¢)
is common knowledge.9
nationally and worldwide. Also, they asked whether the …rms were leaders or followers in
the respective markets. Carlin et al. (2000) used the following measures of competition.
First, they asked managers how many competitors they had. Second, they asked about
price elasticity of demand for the …rm’s products. Their empirical analysis …nds weak
positive relationship between concentration and barter.
8The best examples of such inputs are natural gas and electricity that can be trans-
ported only via the distribution system owned by the seller. Also, if the input is buyer-
speci…c and/or transportation costs are high, every resale is very costly.
9If S knew v; perfect (…rst-degree) price discrimination would be feasible. Russian
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The timing is as follows. S o¤ers a menu of contracts, then the buyer
learns her type v and chooses which contract to take. The contract is exe-
cuted and the trade occurs.
Let us make some technical assumptions about the distribution function.
Denote G(v) the average value of output given it is below v :
G(v) =
Z v
0
xdF (x)=
Z v
0
dF (x) (1)
Assumption A1. Density f (v) = F 0(v) is continuous and positive. v ¡
G(v) is an increasing function of v: The hazard rate f (v)=(1 ¡ F (v)) is a
non-decreasing function of v:
This assumption is satis…ed whenever distribution is su¢ciently close to
uniform. For the uniform distribution F (v) = v; G(v) = v=2; v¡G(v) = v=2;
f(v)=(1¡ F (v)) = 1=(1¡ v):
To have a benchmark, let us …nd the social optimum. The …rst best is
to supply one unit of the input to the buyers with v ¸ c and shut down all
the others. This outcome would be implemented if the input market were
perfectly competitive. The price of the input would then be set equal to its
marginal cost c: Only buyers with v ¸ c would buy the input and produce.
Total social welfare would be W ¤ =
R 1
c (v ¡ c)f (v)dv = G(1) ¡ c + (c ¡
G(c))F (c):
In the second best, the seller o¤ers a menu of contracts f(p; q)g: ’buy
q 2 [0; 1] units of input and pay p in cash’. If a buyer with quality v picks
a contract (p; q) her utility is vq ¡ p while the seller gets p¡ cq. According
to the Revelation Principle we can re-formulate the problem as follows: the
monopoly o¤ers a menu of contracts f(p(v); q(v))g; v 2 [0; 1] such that each
type v selects a contract (p(v); q(v)g: The seller maximizesZ 1
0
(p(v)¡ cq(v))f (v)dv
subject to incentive compatibility constraints
vq(v)¡ p(v) ¸ vq(v0)¡ p(v0) for all v; v0 2 [0; 1]
economy, and especially its part involved in barter transactions, is very non-transparent
(Pinto et al. (1999)), so that assuming asymmetric information seems to be rather ad-
equate. Also, uncertain economic environment reduces the value of learning in repeated
interaction.
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and individual rationality constraints vq(v)¡ p(v) ¸ 0 for all v 2 [0; 1]:
A straightforward analysis of this adverse selection problem (see Salanie
(1997)) gives
q(v) = arg max
q2[0;1]
q
"
v ¡ c¡ 1¡ F (v)
f (v)
#
The seller o¤ers only two contracts f(pm; 1); (0; 0)g.10 The price pm solves
pm ¡ c = (1¡ F (pm))=f (pm): (2)
All buyers with v ¸ pm will buy and produce and the others will not.11 The
deadweight lossZ pm
c
(v ¡ c)f (v)dv = (G(pm)¡ c)F (pm) + (c¡G(c))F (c) (3)
arises due to the fact that buyers with v 2 (c; pm) that could potentially
add value, do not produce: This equilibrium is essentially a textbook case
of a non-discriminating monopoly serving a market with the demand curve
D(p) = 1¡ F (p):
2.2 Barter as a means of price discrimination
Now we shall introduce in-kind payments. Suppose that the seller can o¤er
the buyers a menu of triples f(p; b; q)g: buy q 2 [0; 1] units of input for cash
payment p and in-kind payment b · q: The buyer produces q units of output
out of which b units are given back to the seller.
In this paper, we introduce all possible shortcomings of barter in order to
show that in the presence of market power barter can emerge even if it is very
ine¢cient.12 The …rst drawback of barter is the need for double coincidence
of wants. We assume that the seller values the buyer’s output less than the
buyer herself. A unit of buyer v’s product is worth only ®v to S, where
0 < ® < 1: This assumption implies that the seller has an inferior technology
10The intuition for the corner solution is simple: both B and S are risk-neutral and their
valuations of the input are linear in quantity. In the equilibrium, there are no contracts
with q 2 (0; 1).
11We assume that, whenever indi¤erent, the buyers choose to buy the input and produce.
12Also, we neglect liquidity constraints that may make money inferior to barter.
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for re-selling or using the buyer’s product.13 The cost of barter 1 ¡ ® may
be interpreted as a probability that there is no double coincidence of wants
so that S has to throw the in-kind payments away.
The other problem is that, unlike money, the barter is not perfectly di-
visible.14 For the simplicity’s sake we assume the extreme degree of indi-
visibility and will only allow contracts with b = f0; 1g. Together with the
condition b · q; indivisibility implies that S can o¤er only barter contracts
with b = q = 1.
If the buyer v chooses a contract (p; b; q), she gets v(q¡ b)¡p. The seller
gets ®vb ¡ cq + p: Again, according to the Revelation Principle, the seller
chooses p(v); q(v) 2 [0; 1] and b(v) 2 f0; 1g; b(v) · q(v) that maximizeZ 1
0
(p(v) + ®vb(v)¡ cq(v))f(v)dv (4)
subject to incentive-compatibility constraints
v(q(v)¡ b(v))¡ p(v) ¸ v(q(v0)¡ b(v0))¡ p(v0) for all v; v0 2 [0; 1] (5)
and individual rationality constraints
v(q(v)¡ b(v)) ¸ 0 for all v 2 [0; 1]: (6)
In order to characterize the solution, we shall introduce more notation. De-
note pmb the solution to
pmb(1¡ ®) = (1¡ F (pmb))=f (pmb): (7)
Proposition 1 The optimal menu of contracts f(p; b; q)g is as follows. There
exists ¹c such that if c < ¹c; S chooses to use barter and o¤ers the following
13A more general approach would be to assume that the value of buyer v’s output to
the seller is an arbitrary function ¯(v) where ¯(v) · v: We have checked some alternative
formulations and found that analysis becomes much more complex without adding more
insights.
14The indivisibility assumption is a shortcut for taking into account increasing returns
in barter exchange. The legal, storage and transportation costs per unit of barter decrease
with the amount bartered. Therefore exchanging small portions of the good may be
prohibitively costly.
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menu of contracts: f(pmb; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1); (0; 0; 0)g:15 If c > ¹c; S chooses not to
use barter and o¤ers the couple f(pm; 0; 1); (0; 0; 0)g where pm solves (2):
The intuition is again simple. Since both seller’s and buyers’ preferences
are linear in quantity, there are no contracts with q between zero and one.
Further on, we will only study the case where the monopoly is better-o¤
using barter.
Assumption A2. The monopoly is better-o¤ using barter: c < ¹c:
When S chooses to use barter, the buyers with higher valuations v ¸ pmb
buy and pay in cash while the buyers with lower valuations buy and pay
in kind. The barter customers with v < c that should be closed down in
the social optimum are pooled together with the e¢cient ones v 2 [c; pmb]
and there is no possibility to sort them out (barter is indivisible).16 On the
other hand if the cash price is su¢ciently high, serving this pool of barter
customers is still pro…table for the seller. The average quality of the output
is G(pmb) and therefore S gets pro…t whenever pmb > p¤; where
®G(p¤) = c: (8)
A2 implies pmb > p¤. Indeed, we have the following chain of inequalities:
(pmb ¡ c)(1 ¡ F (pmb)) + (®G(pmb) ¡ c)F (pmb) > (pm ¡ c)(1 ¡ F (pm)) =
maxp f(p¡ c)(1¡ F (p))g ¸ (pmb ¡ c)(1 ¡ F (pmb)). Therefore (®G(pmb) ¡
c)F (pmb) > 0. The other implication of A2 is that the monetary price is
higher in the presence of barter: pmb > pm (see the Proof): The intuition
is simple: if there were no barter, increasing the cash price would result in
losing customers, while in the presence of barter, these customers are not lost
15This menu is similar to a standard debt contract with a privately known value of
collateral. The contract states: ”S supplies a unit of input to B; B must pay S pmb in cash
or S gets ownership of B’s output”. The barter trade is therefore similar to (ine¢cient)
liquidation. Unlike the conventional models of debt (Hart (1995)), we assume that there
is no possibility for ex post renegotiation (or that the renegotiation is very costly). The
model with renegotiation where the buyer has at least some bargaining power has a very
similar equilibrium, except, of course, elimination of the deadweight loss due to the double
coincidence of wants.
16In equilibrium, the barter customers get zero rent (S has full bargaining power). We
assume that, whenever indi¤erent between producing and closing down, the buyers choose
to produce. If the opposite were the case, S would have to o¤er the menu of contracts
f(pmb ¡ ²; 0; 1); (¡²; 1; 1); (0; 0; 0)g where ² > 0 is a very small amount. Then the barter
customers would get the rent of ²:
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— they switch to paying in kind and actually improve the average quality of
the in-kind payments.
Example. Consider a uniform distribution f(p) ´ 1: In this case ¹c =
(1¡ ®=2)¡1=2 ¡ 1; pmb = (2¡ ®)¡1; pm = (1 + c)=2; p¤ = 2c=®:
The welfare e¤ect of barter is ambiguous. The deadweight loss in the
equilibrium with barter is (1¡®)G(pmb)F (pmb)+ (c¡G(c))F (c) which may
be greater or less than the deadweight loss would be if the barter contracts
were not allowed (3). There are two sources of ine¢ciency. First, the direct
ine¢ciency of barter is due to the fact that the seller gets the good that she
does not need as much as the buyer ® < 1. Second, the ine¢cient buyers
with v < c get the input and produce. These two e¤ects may be either
larger or smaller than the deadweight loss (3) without barter that is caused
by underprovision of the input by the monopoly seller.
This simple model illustrates the relevant policy trade-o¤s. If barter were
prohibited, a monopoly would produce too little, some e¢cient buyers would
close down. However, if barter is allowed, the losses are not only due to the
lack of double coincidence of wants (proportional to 1¡ ®). There are also
losses due to the asymmetric information about the quality of payments in
kind. The average value of the barter payments is greater than the input cost
but some of the barter customers actually subtract value. Thus the model
rather supports the claim that barter helps ine¢cient …rms survive and delay
restructuring since they are pooled together with pro…table ones in the barter
market.17 This is an implication of indivisibility of barter. If barter payments
were perfectly divisible, the seller would be able to discriminate against the
ine¢cient buyers and only sell for barter to the buyers with v > c=® (see the
Comment in the Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix).
2.3 Barter in oligopoly
In this Subsection we extend our analysis to the case of oligopoly. Suppose
that there are N identical sellers with the same marginal cost c. We will look
at the second-degree price discrimination under Cournot oligopoly assuming
17Our model is an adverse selection model and is not very appropriate for analyzing
restructuring. One should consider a moral hazard model with investment in productivity
v: Apparently, barter would provide less incentives for such investment. Indeed, the buyer
gets rent U(v) = maxfv ¡ pmb; 0g: If barter were not allowed, U(v) = maxfv ¡ pb; 0g: A2
implies that pmb > pb, hence less incentives to invest in productivity.
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that sellers determine how much to sell for cash and for barter taking into
account self-selection of buyers.
Our model is an extension of the Model I in Oren et al. (1983). Each
…rm o¤ers the following menu of contracts: a non-linear cash tari¤ (p(q); 0; q);
q 2 [0; 1] (”pick any q 2 [0; 1] and pay p(q) in cash”) and a barter contract
(p; 1; 1) (”take one unit of input and pay one unit of output and p in cash”).
Each …rm chooses the optimal tari¤ p(q); p in order to maximize their pro…ts
given the market shares of their competitors (in equilibrium, all tari¤s will be
the same). Each buyer selects the contract that maximizes her rent U (v) =
v(q¡ b)¡p: Buyers compare three options: (a) the outside option that gives
a trivial payo¤, (b) the barter contract that gives U = ¡p and (c) the cash
contract that gives U(v) = maxq2[0;1] vq ¡ p(q): The incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints imply (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix)
that there exists such v that: (i) all buyers with v < v take the outside option
or pay in kind and (ii) all buyers with v > v pay in cash; (iii) among the
cash customers, higher types buy greater quantities. Let us denote v¤(q) the
highest type that buys q units of input and pays in cash. Apparently, v¤(q)
is an increasing function.
We de…ne the Cournot equilibrium as in Oren et al. (1983).18 Each seller
i is characterized by a function Ti(q) — the number of customers buying no
more than q units for cash from i. Apparently,
PN
i=1 Ti(q) = F (v
¤(q)) for
all q > 0. Ti(0) is the number of customers buying for barter from i. Each
seller takes Tj(q), j 6= i as given and chooses the tari¤s p(q), p and Ti(0) to
maximize pro…t
(®G(v¤(0))¡ c)(F (v¤(0))¡ T¡i(q))Ti(0)1(p ¸ 0)+
+
Z 1
0
(p(q)¡ cq)d(F (v¤(q))¡ T¡i(q)) (9)
subject to the constraint that v¤(q) is the inverse of the buyer’s optimal
response to p(q), p: Here T¡i(q) =
P
j 6=i Tj(q); 1(p ¸ 0) is the indicator
function that equals 1 whenever p ¸ 0 and 0 otherwise: We will look for
symmetric equilibria where Ti(q) = Tj(q) for all i; j; q:
18There are several approaches to modelling second-degree price discrimination under
oligopoly. Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) and Stole (1995) look at the second-degree price
discrimination under duopoly with imperfect substitutes. Those models are too compli-
cated to study comparative statics with regard to change in the number of sellers. This
is why we turn to the Cournot oligopoly with perfect substitutes studied in Oren et al.
(1983).
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Lemma 1 In any Cournot equilibrium, there are no buyers who buy q 2
(0; 1) for cash.
As well as in the monopoly case, the linear utility and cost functions rule
out the intermediate quantities. This makes the contract menu very simple:
some buyers choose to buy one unit for cash, some buy one unit for barter
and the rest do not buy at all. The function Ti(q) is now fully characterized
by two numbers: Ti(0) and Ti(1): Each …rm sells yi = Ti(1)¡Ti(0) for cash at
the market price P = p(1)¡p(0) and zi = Ti(0) for the buyers’ output. In the
Cournot equilibrium, total quantity supplied to the cash market Y =
PN
i=1 yi
equals quantity demanded
R 1
P f (v)dv = 1¡ F (P ): The rest of buyers v < P
are indi¤erent between buying in the barter market or not buying at all. The
average quality of the barter payment is therefore E(vjv < P ) = G(P ). Since
buyers in the barter market are indi¤erent between buying and not buying
we assume that whenever the total supply in the barter market Z =
PN
i=1 zi
is below F (P ), the demand is stochastically rationed so that the average
quality of payments in kind remains G(P ).
The seller i takes other seller’s strategies yj and zj as given and maximizes
¼(yi; y¡i; zi) = P (yi + y¡i)yi + zi®G(P (yi + y¡i))¡ cyi ¡ czi (10)
subject to
0 · zi · F (P (yi + y¡i))¡ z¡i: (11)
Here y¡i =
P
j 6=i yj, z¡i =
P
j 6=i zj . The inverse demand function P (Y ) is
given by Y = 1¡ F (P ) so that P 0(Y ) = ¡1=f (P (Y )):
Formally, we shall look for the Nash equilibria in the game among N
sellers whose strategies are couples (yi; zi) that satisfy (11) and yi ¸ 0: The
payo¤s are given by (10).19
We will classify equilibria by the presence of barter and then study com-
parative statics with regard to change in N:20 Notice that …rm i has an incen-
tive to sell for barter whenever @¼=@zi = ®G(P (Y ))¡ c ¸ 0 or P (Y ) ¸ p¤:
19Strictly speaking, the game is not de…ned in the normal form, since other players’
strategies in‡uence both payo¤ function and the set of possible strategies for each player.
However, we can easily reformulate the problem by setting the payo¤ equal to (10) if (11)
is satis…ed and ¡1 otherwise.
20In this stylized model we take N to be a positive real number. However, at N = 1 the
equilibria will indeed coincide with the ones in case of monopoly.
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1. ’Barter’ equilibria. This is the case where P (Y ) ¸ p¤: The objective
function (10) increases with zi: Therefore the sellers want to barter
as much as possible zi = F (P ) ¡ z¡i: The …rst order condition for yi
implies yi = f (P ) [P ¡ ®G(P )¡ ®(P ¡G(P ))(F (P )¡ z¡i)=F (P )] :21
Adding up for i = 1; ::; N and dividing by f (P ) we obtain the equation
for equilibrium price:
(P ¡ ®G(P ))N ¡ ®(P ¡G(P )) = 1¡ F (P )
f (P )
: (12)
We will denote pb(N) the price P that solves (12) for a given N: The
necessary and su¢cient condition for existence of a barter equilibrium
is pb(N) ¸ p¤: The total amount of barter sales is Z = F (pb(N)). The
barter sales of individual sellers zi must satisfy
PN
i=1 zi = Z: In the
symmetric equilibrium zi = F (pb)=N and Yi = (1¡F (pb))=N: There is
also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In all equilibria, however,
P and Z are the same.
2. ’No-barter’ equilibria. If P · p¤; the sellers do not barter zi = 0 and
the …rst order condition for yi implies yi = (P ¡ c)f (P ): Adding up
and dividing by f(P ) we get the conventional Cournot equilibrium:
(P ¡ c)N = 1¡ F (P )
f(P )
(13)
Let us introduce pnb(N ) as a solution to (13). The necessary and su¢-
cient condition for existence of a no-barter equilibrium is pnb(N ) · p¤:
The total amount of barter sales is zero.
3. ’Rationed barter’ equilibria. If P = p¤; the sellers are indi¤erent about
how much to o¤er for barter. The …rst order condition for yi implies
yi = (p
¤ ¡ c)f (p¤)¡ zi(p¤ ¡G(p¤))f(p¤)=F (p¤): Adding up, we get
Z=F (p¤) = [(p¤ ¡ c)N ¡ (1¡ F (p¤))=f(p¤)] = [®(p¤ ¡G(p¤))] (14)
Barter sales of individual sellers zi must satisfy
PN
i=1 zi = Z: The nec-
essary and su¢cient condition for the existence of a rationed-barter
equilibrium is (11) i.e. 0 · Z=F (p¤) · 1: These inequalities hold if
21We have used the identity G0(p) = (p ¡ G(p))f(p)=F (p):
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and only if both inequalities pb(N) ¸ p¤ and pnb(N) · p¤ hold. Thus
the rationed barter equilibrium exists if and only if both ’barter’ and
’no-barter’ equilibria exist.
Let us denote N b a solution to pb(N) = p¤ andNnb a solution to pnb(N) =
p¤:
Example. For the uniform distribution f(p) ´ 1; Nnb = (1¡2c=®)=(2c=®¡
c); N b = (1¡ 2c=®+ c)=(2c=® ¡ c):
Proposition 2 Assume A1-A2. Both N b and Nnb exist and N b > Nnb. The
set of equilibria of the game above is as follows:
1. If N < Nnb then there is a unique stable equilibrium which is a barter
equilibrium
2. If N > N b then there is a unique stable equilibrium which is a no-barter
equilibrium
3. If N 2 (Nnb; N b) then there are three equilibria two of which (barter
and no-barter) are stable and one (rationed barter) is unstable.
4. If N = N b then there are two equilibria: a stable one (no-barter) and
an unstable one (barter).
5. If N = Nnb then there are two equilibria: a stable one (barter) and an
unstable one (no-barter).
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of equilibria according to Proposition 2.
The intuition for multiplicity of equilibria at N 2 (Nnb;N b) is as follows.
Whenever one seller chooses to sell more for cash, she drives down the cash
price of the input. The additional cash purchases are made by the buyers who
were initially the most e¢cient ones among those buying for barter. With
these buyers switching from barter to cash, the average quality of payments
in kind goes down. The other sellers will therefore have incentives to sell
more for cash and less for barter.22
It it interesting to see how the share of barter in sales in the indus-
try B = Z=(Z + Y ) changes with the number of sellers N: In the barter
22This externality is somewhat similar to aggregate demand externality in the new
Keynesian macroeconomics or the market size externality in the development economics
(Ray (1998)).
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 pnb(N)
 p*
N bN nb N0
 p
 pb(N)
Figure 1: Oligopoly price P as function of number of sellers N:
equilibria B = Z = F (pb(N)). Since pb(N) is a continuous decreasing func-
tion, B is a continuous decreasing function of N: In the no-barter equilibria
B = Z = 0: In the rationed barter equilibria Y = 1 ¡ F (p¤); Z is a lin-
ear function of N given by (14). Therefore B = [1 + (1¡ F (p¤))=Z]¡1 is a
continuous increasing hyperbolic function of N that connects points (Nnb; 0)
and (N b; F (p¤)) in the (N;B) space (see Figure 2).
Let us brie‡y discuss what properties of the model determine the struc-
ture of equilibria. First, both in barter and no-barter equilibria, prices go
down if number of sellers increases. Second, for a given market structure,
the cash price in barter equilibrium is greater than the price in no-barter
equilibrium. This is also intuitive. In barter equilibria, sellers have more in-
centives to charge higher prices because the marginal buyers who would leave
the market in case of no-barter equilibria, now simply switch to barter and
therefore contribute to pro…ts from barter sales. Third, in barter equilibria
16
Barter equilibria
B
0 Nnb Nb N
   F(p*)
Rationed-barter equilibria
No-barter equilibria
Figure 2: Share of barter sales in total sales B = Z=(Z + Y ) as a function of
number of sellers N:
the cash price should be above certain level p¤ otherwise the average qual-
ity of payments in kind is below marginal cost and barter is not pro…table.
Similarly, in no-barter equilibria price should be below p¤: Under these three
conditions, the structure of equilibria should be exactly like in Figures 1 and
2.
It is not clear whether the barter equilibrium is more or less e¢cient
than the no-barter one. In the no-barter equilibria, there is a deadweight
loss since the cash price is higher than the marginal cost. Therefore some
e¢cient buyers do not produce. In the barter equilibria, all buyers produce
including the value-subtracting ones. Also, there are transactions costs of
barter (1 ¡ ®)F (pb(N))G(pb(N)). The social planner has to compare the
deadweight loss in the no-barter equilibrium where too many …rms are shut
down but transaction costs are low with one in the barter equilibrium where
17
 0 1/Nb   1/Nnb            1/N
   F(p*)
B
Barter equilibria
Rationed-barter equilibria
Figure 3: Share of barter in sales B as a function of concentration 1=N . At
certain concentration below 1=Nnb there occurs an abrupt jump from barter
to no-barter equilibrium. At concentrations above 1=Nnb, the industry is in
the barter equilibrium.
too few …rms are shut down and transaction costs are high.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Empirical predictions
The model implies the following empirical predictions. First, the greater
the market concentration 1=N; the greater the level of barter in sales B =
R=(R + Q): Second, there should be a structural break in the range 1=N 2
[1=N b; 1=Nnb] where the industry jumps from the no-barter equilibrium to
the barter equilibrium. This is illustrated in the Fig.3 (which is essentially
Fig.2 redrawn in (1=N;B) coordinates).
When testing these empirical implications, we will have to control for two
alternative explanations of a positive relationship between market concentra-
tion and barter. First, market concentration is correlated with …rm’s size.
At the same time, double coincidence of wants is a smaller problem for larger
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…rms so they should have more barter. (In terms of our model, larger …rms
tend to have higher ®.)
The other argument is that in consumer good industries there are many
small …rms, and all …rms receive cash from individual consumers (or retail
trade companies). Indeed, for individual consumers, the transactions costs
of barter are prohibitively high. In the intermediate good industries, the
minimum e¢ciency scale is high, there are fewer …rms and they supply to
other …rms (or wholesale trade) who are able to pay in kind. Thus, if we
assume that the farther from the retail market the less cash is paid, there
should be a positive correlation between distance from the consumer market
and barter. Since there is also a positive correlation between the distance to
market and concentration, barter and concentration should be correlated.
3.2 Data and variables
We use the dataset ’Barter in Russian industrial …rms’ built in the New
Economic School’s Research Project ’Non-Monetary Transactions in Russian
Economy’. This dataset was created by matching the annual surveys of man-
agers of Russian industrial …rms conducted since 1996 by Serguei Tsoukhlo
(Institute of Economies in Transition, Moscow) with Goskomstat database of
Russian …rms (Federal Committee for Statistics of Russian Federation) and
RECEP Import Penetration Database (Russian European Center for Eco-
nomic Policy). Since the penetration ratios were only available for years for
1996, we ran regressions for a cross-section of 1996.23
The barter data include about six hundred …rms. The barter data are
answers of …rms’ managers to the following (eight) questions: ’how much of
your …rm’s inputs (outputs) were paid in rubles, in dollars, in kind and in
wechsels? ’ The Goskomstat database includes compulsory statistical reports
that all large and medium-size …rms must submit to the Federal Statistics
Committee. There are over 16 thousand …rms in the database. After match-
ing barter data with the Goskomstat data we ended up with 475 observations.
The sample includes …rms of all sizes with annual sales from tens of thousands
US dollars to several hundred million US dollars (about 4% of the sample
23In a working paper Guriev and Kvassov (2000), we also included 1997 data (without
import penetration) and the results were similar. The RECEP Foreign Trade Project was
completed in 1997, and we are not aware of any source of industy-level import penetration
data for later years.
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have sales exceeding $100 million US dollars). Neither Gazprom nor Uni…ed
Energy Systems are included in our sample.
Import database contains import penetration ratios for all product cate-
gories and all industries, so we can adjust market concentration for import
penetration.
The concentration ratios CR4 (share of four biggest …rms in total sales
of an industry) were calculated for 5-digit OKONKh industries using the
Goskomstat database and then adjusted for import penetration using RE-
CEP database.24 Russian 5-digit industries are similar to US 4-digit indus-
tries; there are about 450 …ve-digit industries in Russia. In our sample, only
149 industries are represented so that we have on average 3.2 …rms in each
industry, with up to 22 …rms in some industries (the median industry has 7
…rms). Given the average CR4 in these industries is almost 40 per cent, this
is quite a few. An alternative approach would be to use CR4s for broader
(e.g. 4-digit) industries. However, we believe that such concentration ratios
are less informative. In Russia’s OKONKh classi…cation many 4-digit indus-
tries include 5-digit industries that use each other’s outputs as inputs in their
production. In such 4-digit industries, …rm do not compete with each other:
their products are not substitutes.
The main goal of empirical analysis is to estimate the e¤ect of concentra-
tion on share of barter in sales controlling for other variables that may a¤ect
barter. First, we should control for the …rm’s size. As a proxy for size we use
logarithm of annual sales in denominated rubles. (We have also tried other
measures of size such as employment and got similar results.)
Second, since our model applies to inter-…rm transactions we need to con-
trol for sales to foreign and retail customers. The former is easy to measure:
we use share of exports in sales export.25 It is less clear how to control for
retail sales. As a proxy for sales to consumers we have used a consumer good
industry dummy (CGI). We have set CGI = 1 for consumer good industries
and CGI = 0 otherwise. In our sample, 27% …rms are in consumer good in-
dustries. Unfortunately, CGI is a very crude estimate of a …rm’s exposure to
24We thank David Brown and Annette Brown for providing us with the concentration
ratios they have calculated. The CR4s they have obtained coincide with ones that Federal
Antimonopoly Committee has included in its Annual Report.
25Certainly, it makes sense to distinguish exports by countries. We have tried to include
CIS and non-CIS exports separately into regression and found no signi…cant di¤erence. It
is no wonder since non-CIS exports include exports to developing countries where counter-
trade is common.
20
consumer market and is in fact industry-speci…c rather than …rm-speci…c.26
In what follows, we report the estimates where CGI dummy was simply
added to the regressions; we have also tried to run separate regressions for
industries with CGI = 1 and CGI = 0 and obtained similar results.
In order to control for transportation costs, we have introduced the follow-
ing regional dummies: rgmsk = 1 if the …rm is based in Moscow, rgural = 1
if the …rm is based in Urals, rgsib = 1 if the …rm is based in Siberia or
Far East. The base category is European Russia except Moscow. To con-
trol for technological di¤erences between the industries, we also include ten
broad industry dummies in the regressions (these roughly correspond to 2-
digit industry codes, see the de…nitions in the Table A1 in the Appendix). In
our model, all industries are the same except for the market concentration.
In reality, however, there may be some industry-speci…c characteristics that
facilitate or hinder barter exchanges (e.g. per unit transportation costs).
As a measure of market concentration we use concentration ratios CR4
and import-adjusted concentration ratios CR4ia: CR4 is the share of four
largest …rms in total output of all …rms calculated for a 5-digit industry, and
CR4ia = CR4 ¤ (1 ¡ imp): Here imp is the import penetration ratio for a
5-digit industry (we assume that the world market is competitive).
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix are shown in the Ap-
pendix A. The share of barter in sales varies a lot across …rms. It is distrib-
uted almost uniformly between 0 and 0:83. Only 10% of the sample have
no barter at all which means that we are unlikely to have industries with
N < Nnb in our sample.
The signs of pair-wise correlations are mostly intuitive. There is indeed
more barter in concentrated industries (controlling and not-controlling for
imports), in larger …rms and in those which sell less to foreign customers
and consumers. Consumer good industries are less concentrated.27 The
need for adjustment of concentration ratios for imports is quite clear: on
average, import penetration is 38%, it varies a lot across industries, and
26The latest data we have for production of consumer goods at the …rm level date back
to 1993. In 1993, share of consumers goods in output were indeed correlated with CGI.
In consumer good industries CGI = 1; the share of consumer goods was 48 per cent while
in the other industries it was only 13 per cent. We tried to include the 1993 consumer
sales into the regression, and those turned out to be insigni…cant.
27Average CR4 for consumer good industries is 24 per cent which is signi…cantly lower
than in the other industries (42 per cent). A similar di¤erence is observed for CR4ia: 14
vs. 25 per cent. Both di¤erences are signi…cant at 1% level.
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import penetration and CR4 are positively correlated.
3.3 Empirical results
The results of the basic OLS regressions for share of barter in sales are
shown in Table 1. The estimates with imported-adjusted concentration are
presented in the columns I-III, while columns IV-VI contain results of regres-
sions with concentration ratios not adjusted for imports. The …rst regression
(I) shows that barter positively and signi…cantly depends on concentration.
When we include CGI (column II), the e¤ect of concentration decreases by
about a quarter. This may re‡ect the technological di¤erences between the
industries: when we include the 2-digit industry dummies (column III), the
coe¢cient at CGI becomes insigni…cant while the coe¢cient at CR4ia even
increases. The estimates with CR4 instead of CR4ia (columns IV-VI) show
that the e¤ect of concentration is weaker and even not signi…cant at 10%
level if we do not control for imports. The e¤ects of CGI and 2-digit indus-
try dummies are perfectly similar.
Other coe¢cients have predicted signs. There is indeed more barter in
larger …rms. The magnitude of the e¤ect is moderate: the coe¢cient of 0.014
— 0.022 implies that if one …rm is ten times as large as the other one, it will
have 3-5 per cent more barter in sales. The e¤ect of exports is similar: the
coe¢cient is negative but not very large (only 18-19 per cent). If a …rm’s
exports increase by one dollar, it will have roughly twenty cents less sold for
barter.28 There is 15 per cent less barter in Moscow, 13 per cent more barter
in Urals and 11 per cent more barter in Siberia, than in European Russia,
so that geography is an important determinant of barter. Firms in consumer
good industries have 8 per cent less barter, and most of this di¤erence comes
from the di¤erentials between 2-digit industries.29
In order to test for the structural break in CR4ia we have introduced
28Commander and Mummsen (1998) obtain a similar estimate for the e¤ect of exports
on barter (19 per cent). The fact that the coe¢cient is below 1, raises a very interesting
question. It suggests that many …rms are paid for their exports in kind by the inter-
mediaries who then sell the output for hard currency. In our sample, export revenues
exceed hard currency receipts for most …rms. Therefore the e¤ect of share of exports in
sales on barter may also be attibuted to the e¤ect of competition: most Russian …rms are
price-takers in the foreign markets.
29For the sake of brevity, we do not present the coe¢cients at industry dummies. The
food industry has 8% less barter, while pulp and forestry has 13% more barter than other
industries. The other di¤erentials are less striking.
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B I II III IV V VI
CR4ia
0.17**
(0.08)
0.13*
(0.07)
0.15*
(0.08)
CR4
0.10
(0.07)
0.07
(0.06)
0.10
(0.06)
size
0.015*
(0.008)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.008)
0.016*
(0.008)
0.022***
(0.008)
export
-0.08
(0.06)
-0.11**
(0.06)
-0.18***
(0.06)
-0.09
(0.06)
-0.12**
(0.06)
-0.19***
(0.06)
CGI
-0.08***
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.08***
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.03)
rgmsk
-0.16***
(0.03)
-0.15***
(0.04)
-0.13***
(0.03)
-0.16***
(0.03)
-0.15***
(0.03)
-0.14***
(0.03)
rgural
0.13***
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.05)
0.13***
(0.04)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.05)
0.12***
(0.05)
rgsib
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.03)
ind0s — — *** — — ***
const
0.08
(0.13)
0.13
(0.14)
-0.21
(0.13)
0.06
(0.13)
0.11
(0.13)
-0.22*
(0.12)
N 475 475 475 475 475 475
R2 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.22
Table 1: OLS regressions for B. Standard errors (in parentheses) are esti-
mated via Huber/White procedure taking into account unobserved correla-
tions within 5-digit industries. Notation: ¤¤¤ signi…cant at 1% level, ¤¤ 5%
level, ¤ 10% level.
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Figure 4: Andrews’ statistic as a function of the suspected structural change
point » in the coe¢cient ¯ for the equation Bi = ®+¯ ¤CR4iai+° ¤ sizei+
± ¤ exporti + ³ ¤ CGIi + · ¤ rgmski + ¸ ¤ rgurali + ¹ ¤ rgsibi + ": The two
highest peaks are » = 0:078 and » = 0:103:
a dummy D» that takes the value of 1 if CR4ia < » and D = 0 otherwise.
Then we added a termD»¤CR4ia to our regression. The coe¢cient at CR4ia
would then show the e¤ect of concentration for industries with CR4ia > ».
The e¤ect of concentration for competitive industries CR4ia < » would be
equal to the sum of coe¢cients at CR4ia and D» ¤ CR4ia:
To …nd the break point » we have calculated the Andrews’ statistic (An-
drews, 1993) for every » 2 [0:05; 0:50], i.e. for the whole range CR4ia except
for lower and upper deciles (Andrews suggests to cut o¤ upper and lower …f-
teen per cent of distribution). As shown in the Figure 4, the statistic exceeds
the asymptotic critical values calculated in Andrews (1993) at » = 0:078
and » = 0:103. In our sample, 28% observations are in the industries with
CR4ia < 0:078; and 40% are in the industries with CR4ia < 0:103:
The results of the regressions with structural change are presented in
the Table 2. The results are consistent with our model. Columns I and II
contain estimates for the structural breaks at » = 0:078 and » = 0:103: As
can be seen in Column I, the e¤ect of concentration in more competitive
industries (CR4ia < 0:078) is much greater (0.20+1.36=1.56) than in more
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B I II III IV
CR4ia
0.20***
(0.07)
0.23***
(0.08)
0.22**
(0.09)
D» ¤ CR4ia 1.36**(0.59)
1.09***
(0.41)
1.25***
(0.43)
CR4
0.18***
(0.06)
D» ¤ CR4 1.23***(0.30)
size
0.015*
(0.008)
0.016*
(0.008)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.008)
export
-0.12**
(0.06)
-0.12**
(0.05)
-0.18***
(0.05)
-0.13**
(0.06)
CGI
-0.09**
(0.04)
-0.09**
(0.03)
-0.04*
(0.02)
-0.09**
(0.04)
rgmsk
-0.14***
(0.03)
-0.15***
(0.03)
-0.13***
(0.03)
-0.14***
(0.03)
rgural
0.14***
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.05)
0.13***
(0.04)
0.13**
(0.05)
rgsib
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.10**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
ind0s — — *** —
const
0.08
(0.13)
0.06
(0.13)
-0.21*
(0.13)
0.03
(0.13)
N 475 475 475 475
R2 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.17
Table 2: OLS regressions with structural change. Column I shows estimates
for » = 0:078, Column II shows estimates for » = 0:103. Column III presents
estimates for » = 0:082, which is the optimal structural change point for a
regression with 2-digit industry dummies. Column IV show estimates for a
regression with concentration ratios not adjusted for imports (the break point
in the CR4 is »0 = 0:162). Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via
Huber/White procedure taking into account unobserved correlations within
5-digit industries. Notation: ¤¤¤ signi…cant at 1% level, ¤¤ 5% level, ¤ 10%
level.
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concentrated ones (0.20). The latter coe¢cient (0.20) can be interpreted as
the slope of the barter equilibria curve, while the former (1.56) represents the
abrupt jump from no-barter equilibria curve to the barter equilibria curve.
Same results are observed for » = 0:103: the coe¢cient for competitive
industries is 1.09+0.23=1.32 while the one for concentrated industries is 0.22.
To test for robustness, we also perform tests for regressions with 2-digit in-
dustry dummies (Column III) and with concentration ratios not adjusted
for imports (Column IV). The results are again similar. When the industry
dummies are introduced, the structural break point becomes » = 0:082; and
the coe¢cients become 1.25+0.22=1.47 and 0.22, respectively. In the re-
gressions with CR4s not adjusted for imports, the structural break becomes
»0 = 0:162; 30 and the coe¢cients are 1.23+0.18=1.41 and 0.18.
Thus, the empirical evidence from the cross-section data seems to be
consistent with the predictions of the model even controlling for alterna-
tive explanations. Certainly, panel data evidence would be more convincing.
Indeed, there may be some unobservable …rm characteristics that in‡uence
their willingness to barter (e.g. managers’ ”relational capital” (Gaddy and
Ickes (1998a)). To make a strong empirical argument, one would have to
prove that even controlling for the …rm’s …xed or random e¤ects, change in
competition leads to change in barter. Unfortunately, there are no data to
perform this test. Even ideally, there are only two (at most three) observa-
tions for each …rm: 1996 and 1997.31 In the years of 1995 and 1998, only
during half of a year Russia had low in‡ation and stable exchange rate.
4 Conclusions and policy implications
We have built a simple model of barter as a means of price discrimination.
In our model, buyers are not liquidity constrained and are able to pay cash
for their inputs. Also, there is no double coincidence of wants so that the
barter transactions are less e¢cient than the monetary ones. The buyers do
need the sellers’ product but the sellers do not need the buyers’. The value
30The cuto¤ point CR4 = 0:162 is similar to CR4ia = 0:078 : in our sample, 27% …rms
are in industries with CR4 < 0:162.
31We have run ’panel’ data estimates for 1996 and 1997 (without controlling for import
penetration) and the results were consistent with the model. The results were hardly
convincing though, only half of the …rms in our sample are present both in 1996 and 1997.
Also, the evolution of market concentration over time is quite slow.
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of the buyer’s output to the seller is only ® < 1 of its value to the buyer.
Second, we assume that barter is indivisible. In the asymmetric information
framework this assumption leads to ine¢cient pooling in the barter market.
Since the quality of payments in kind is not observable, ine¢cient buyers will
be engaged in barter along with the e¢cient ones.
Our main result is that even in the presence of all these de…ciencies, barter
can emerge in equilibrium if the markets are su¢ciently concentrated. The
amount of barter increases with concentration. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. Since equilibria under imperfect competition are usually characterized
by underproduction relative to the social optimum, sellers may be interested
in an additional channel of sales even if this channel is costly.
To make the model tractable, we have deliberately introduced a number of
simplifying assumptions. We have assumed linear technology, risk neutrality,
exogenous probability of double coincidence of wants, perfect substitution
of oligopolists’ output, extreme indivisibility, allocated all bargaining power
to the seller etc. If these assumptions were lifted, the model would become
much more complex. For example, assuming convex technology would result
in price discrimination both with and without barter. Barter would still
represent an additional dimension for price discrimination and would hence
be used but the equilibrium contracts would be very complicated.
In order to test predictions of the model, we have built a unique dataset.
We matched a survey of managers’ on the degree of barter in their …rms with
the …rm-level data from o¢cial statistics. The empirical analysis of cross-
section data supports our model. Barter positively and signi…cantly depends
on the concentration especially in a model with a structural break that our
theory predicts.
Our result raises a legitimate question. If barter is explained by high
concentration of market power, why is it observed in Russia and is virtually
non-existent in other economies? One answer to this question would be that
in Russia markets are much more concentrated than in other economies.
This claim is well-accepted by general public and policymakers but is not
supported by data (see Brown et al. (1994)). Our model may o¤er an-
other explanation. For the same level of concentration there may be two
stable equilibria: one with barter and one without barter. Therefore, path-
dependence may be the case. In 1995, a liquidity shock has thrown the
economy into a high barter state. Since that time, price ‡exibility should
have restored equilibrium level of real money stock. The real money bal-
ances, however, are now 2 to 3 times as low as they used to be. In terms of
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Polterovich (1998), Russian economy is in the institutional trap of barter.
The multiple equilibria argument is rather common in modern literature
on transition and development. It is basically the essence of so-called ’post-
Washington consensus’ that is gradually replacing the Washington consensus
on economic transition. The post-Washington consensus states that institu-
tions matter a great deal for economic transition and may fail to emerge
spontaneously. Government should intervene to promote good institutions,
otherwise the economy will …nd itself in a low-level equilibrium. However,
our model does not only con…rm that Russia is in a low-level equilibrium. We
have also shown that at some level of competition the barter equilibrium dis-
appears and industry jumps to the no-barter equilibrium. This argument has
non-trivial policy implications. In order to reduce barter, government should
promote competition. Moreover, even if competition policy may have had a
little e¤ect on barter so far, the government should not give up. Our model
(along with empirical analysis) suggests that barter may fall dramatically
when a certain threshold level of competition is achieved.
The other question is whether policymakers should …ght barter. Our
model provides no clear ranking of the equilibria in terms of social welfare.
We show that from the social planner’s point of view the trade-o¤ is as fol-
lows. Under imperfect competition, the equilibrium without barter is char-
acterized by underproduction: many e¢cient …rms close down. The barter
equilibrium is too soft: all e¢cient …rms produce but so do the ine¢cient
ones. Also, the barter equilibrium is characterized by high transaction costs.
The model predicts that policymakers who are more concerned with excess
employment would rather choose the barter equilibrium as one with fewer
closures and mass redundancies. This may explain why local politicians en-
courage barter relatively more often than the federal government. Certainly,
our model is not a general equilibrium one; it does not take into account some
important negative consequences of demonetization. Widespread barter re-
duces transparency in the economy which in turns leads to poor corporate
governance, lower tax collection and greater corruption.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A1. Description of the variables and summary statistics. Variables
CR4; imp; CR4ia; CGI are de…ned for 5-digit OKONKh industries. Vari-
ables ind1¡ ind11 are 2-digit industry dummies.
Variable Explanation Mean S.D. Median Min Max
B Share of barter in sales 0.37 0.24 0.36 0 0.83
CR4 4-…rm concentration 0.37 0.26 0.33 0.04 1
imp Import penetration 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.003 1
CR4ia Import-adjusted CR4 0.22 0.19 0.15 0 0.99
size Log sales 17.0 1.7 16.9 11.1 22.3
export Share of export in sales 0.08 0.17 0.01 0 0.97
CGI Consumer good industry 0.27 - - 0 1
rgmsk Moscow 0.13 - - 0 1
rgural Urals 0.05 - - 0 1
rgsib Siberia and Far East 0.09 - - 0 1
ind1 Electricity 0 - - 0 1
ind2 Fuel 0.01 - - 0 1
ind3 Ferrous metals 0.08 - - 0 1
ind4 Non-ferrous metals 0.03 - - 0 1
ind5 Chemical 0.12 - - 0 1
ind6 Machinery 0.25 - - 0 1
ind7 Pulp and forestry 0.08 - - 0 1
ind8 Construction materials 0.11 - - 0 1
ind9 Textile 0.15 - - 0 1
ind10 Food 0.15 - - 0 1
ind11 Other 0.03 - - 0 1
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Table A2. The correlation matrix. *** denotes signi…cance at 1% level,
* denotes signi…cance at 10% level.
B CR4 imp CR4ia size export cgi
B 1
CR4 0.16¤¤¤ 1
imp -0.04 0.25¤¤¤ 1
CR4ia 0.18¤¤¤ 0.79¤¤¤ -0.28¤¤¤ 1
size 0.17¤¤¤ 0.28¤¤¤ -0.07 0.29¤¤¤ 1
export 0.02 0.23¤¤¤ 0.08¤ 0.16¤¤¤ 0.32¤¤¤ 1
CGI -0.19¤¤¤ -0.29¤¤¤ -0.13¤¤¤ -0.13¤¤¤ -0.15¤¤¤ -0.19¤¤¤ 1
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
According to Lemma 2, the incentive compatibility and participation con-
straints (5)-(6) imply the following properties of self-selection. There exists
such v that: (i) all buyers with v < v take the outside option or pay in kind;
(ii) all buyers with v > v pay in cash; (iii) among the cash customers, higher
types buy greater quantities: q(v) is a non-decreasing function of v for all
v > v.
Let us calculate the buyer’s rent. Consider arbitrary v0; v00 : v0 < v00:
Using the incentive compatibility constraints (19) we obtain
q(v0)¡ b(v0) · U(v
00)¡ U (v0)
v00 ¡ v0 · q(v
00)¡ b(v00): (15)
Since q(v)¡ b(v) is monotonic (Lemma 2), we can integrate (15):
U(v) = U (0) +
Z v
0
[q(x)¡ b(x)] dx = U(v) +
Z v
v
q(x)dx (16)
for v > v.
The case with p > 0 is equivalent to the model without barter solved in
Subsection 2.1: the optimal menu is f(pm; 0; 1); (0; 0; 0)g: Let us concentrate
on the case where the seller o¤ers a barter contract with p · 0: Then all the
buyers with v < v take this contract and U(v) = U = ¡p:
Substituting p(v) = v(q(v) ¡ b(v)) ¡ U(v) into (4), we rewrite the S’s
problem as follows. The seller chooses U ¸ 0; q(v) 2 [0; 1] and b(v) 2 f0; 1g
to maximize
¡U +
Z v
0
[®v ¡ c] f(v)dv +
Z 1
v
Ã
v ¡ c¡ 1¡ F (v)
f(v)
!
q(v)f(v)dv: (17)
Apparently, S sets U equal to zero (or a very small amount to make it strictly
more attractive than the outside option) and
q(v) = arg max
q2[0;1]
Ã
v ¡ c ¡ 1¡ F (v)
f (v)
!
q
for all v > v where v is to maximize
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¦(v) = (®G(v)¡ c)F (v) + (maxfv; pmg ¡ c)(1¡ F (maxfv; pmg)) (18)
Let us calculate d¦=dv: If v < pm then d¦=dv > 0 whenever v > c=®: If
v < pm then d¦=dv > 0 whenever v < pmb: Thus the solution depends on
the relationship among c=®; pm and pmb: Assumption A1 implies that pm is
always between c=® and pmb. It is either c=® · pm · pmb or c=® ¸ pm ¸ pmb:
Indeed, pm > pmb is equivalent to (1¡F (pm))=f(pm) < (1¡F (pmb))=f(pmb)
and therefore pm¡c < pmb(1¡®) < pm(1¡®) which implies pm < c=®: Similar
argument proves that pm < pmb implies pm > c=®: Therefore the maximizer of
(18) is either v = 0 or v = pmb with the latter possible only if c=® < pm < pmb
is the case. Since v = 0 is a solution without barter we are interested in v =
pmb: In this case the seller gets the payo¤ pmb(1¡F (pmb))+®G(pmb)F (pmb)¡c:
Hence the optimal menu of contracts is either f(pmb; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1); (0; 0; 0)g
or f(pm; 0; 1); (0; 0; 0)g whichever provides the seller with a higher payo¤. Let
us denote ¹c the value of c that solves
max
p2[0;1]
[p(1¡ F (p)) + ®G(p)F (p)]¡ c = max
p2[0;1]
[(p¡ c)(1¡ F (p))] :
The seller chooses to use barter whenever the left-hand side is greater than
the right-hand side, i.e. c < ¹c: Apparently, ¹c increases with ® : d¹c=d® =
G(pmb)F (pmb)=F (pm) > 0; ¹c! 0 at ® ! 0:
Comment. If barter were perfectly divisible b(v) 2 [0; 1], the solution
would be very di¤erent. There could be two cases. If pmb < pm then b = 0
and q = 1 whenever v > pm: If pmb > pm then q = 1 whenever v > c=®
and b = 1 for v < pmb (S can sort the barter customers): The former case
coincides with the monopoly equilibrium without barter. In the latter case,
buyers are split into three groups. The most e¢cient buyers pay cash price
pmb; the buyers with intermediate productivity v 2 (c=®; pmb) pay in kind and
the least productive buyers do not produce. Notice that in this equilibrium
both all buyers with v · pmb receive zero rent and are indi¤erent between
producing and paying in kind or not producing at all. Above, we assumed
that whenever indi¤erent, buyers choose to produce. Therefore, to make
buyers with v < c=® shut down and buyers with v > c=® produce, the seller
must o¤er some in…nitesimal reward to the latter. This can be done through
making 1 ¡ b(v) being strictly positive although very small. Although in
equilibrium b(v) is either 0 or very close to 1, perfect divisibility of barter is
crucial for separating buyers with v 2 (0; c=®) and v 2 (c=®; pmb):
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Lemma 2 If a menu of contracts f(p(v); b(v); q(v))g; q(v) 2 [0; 1]; b(v) 2
f0; 1g; b(v) · q(v) satis…es the incentive compatibility and participation con-
straints (5)-(6) then the following is the case. There exists such v that: (i) all
buyers with v < v take the outside option or pay in kind and (ii) all buyers
with v > v pay in cash; (iii) among cash customers, higher types buy greater
quantities.
Proof. S may o¤er a menu of cash contracts (p; q; 0) and one barter
contract (p; 1; 1). The buyer’s rent in equilibrium is U(v) = v(q(v)¡ b(v))¡
p(v): Buyers who choose the barter contract get U = ¡p: They will prefer
it to the outside option if and only if ¡p ¸ 0: It is important that if the
barter contract is better than the outside option for any buyer, it is also so
for every buyer. Thus if the barter contract is o¤ered and ¡p ¸ 0, all buyers
buy, produce and pay either in kind or in cash.
Let us prove that there is adverse selection: the barter customers are the
ones with lower v’s. The amount of output kept by the buyer q(v)¡ b(v) is a
monotonic function of v: Indeed, let us take arbitrary v0,v00 2 [0; 1] such that
v0 < v00 and write down incentive compatibility constraints:
v00(q(v00)¡ b(v00))¡ p(v00) ¸ v00(q(v0)¡ b(v0))¡ p(v0);
v0(q(v0)¡ b(v0))¡ p(v0) ¸ v0(q(v00)¡ b(v00))¡ p(v00): (19)
Adding up these inequalities, we get (v00¡v0)fq(v00)¡b(v00))¡(q(v0)¡b(v0))g ¸
0: Therefore v0 < v00 implies q(v00)¡ b(v00) ¸ q(v0)¡ b(v0): Thus, if any buyers
pay in kind, those are the buyers with lower quality v than those who pay
in cash. Indeed, for barter customers q(v) ¡ b(v) = 0; while for the cash
customers q(v) ¡ b(v) = q(v) ¸ 0: Hence, there exists v such that buyers
with v < v pay in kind and buyers with v > v pay in cash.
If ¡p < 0; there are no buyers who choose the barter contract. If some
buyers take the outside option, those are the buyers with lower quality v than
those who pay in cash. Indeed, for the customers who drop out, q(v)¡b(v) =
0 which is again less than q(v)¡ b(v) = q(v) for the cash customers.
Among those who pay in cash, buyers with higher v buy and produce
more: since b(v) = 0, q(v) weakly increases with v.
Proof of Lemma 1. The seller maximizes (9) by choosing three scalar
numbers Ti(0); p; p(0) and a function p0(q); q 2 [0; 1]: In this proof we will
concentrate on the latter and will show that the optimal choice of p0(q) does
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not allow for intermediate purchases for cash q 2 (0; 1): Integrating the sec-
ond term in (9) by parts, we get
p(0)(1¡T¡i(q)¡F (v¤(0))+T¡i(0))+
Z q
0
(p0(q)¡c)(1¡T¡i(q)¡F (v¤(q))+T¡i(q))dq
where q is the quantity chosen by the buyers of the highest type v = 1:
The …rst term in (9) does not depend on p0(q); q 2 (0; 1). Therefore, the
seller chooses p0(q) to maximizeZ q
0
(p0(q)¡ c)(1¡ T¡i(q)¡ F (v¤(q)) + T¡i(q))dq: (20)
Buyers choose q solving maxq2[0;1] vq ¡ p(q). Assume that there exist
buyers that buy q 2 (0; 1) for cash: Then the …rst-order condition must hold
v = p0(q): Substituting v¤(q) = p0(q) into (20) we …nd
p0(q) = »¤(q) = argmax»(»¡c)(1¡T¡i(q)¡F (»)+T¡i(q)): The …rst-order
condition is (»¤ ¡ c)f (»¤) = 1¡T¡i(q)¡F (»¤)+T¡i(q): Using the symmetry
condition Ti(q) = Tj(q) = 1N¡1T¡i(q) =
1
N
F (v¤(q)) we obtain
»¤ ¡ c = 1¡ F (»
¤)
Nf(»¤)
:
Assumption A1 implies that such »¤ exists and is unique. It is important
that »¤ is the same for all q: Since p0(q) = »¤ does not depend on q; the price
is linear: p(q) = p(0) + »¤q: Therefore all buyers with v < »¤ will choose not
to buy q = 0 and all buyers with v > »¤ will buy one unit q = 1: The set of
buyers who are indi¤erent v = »¤ has a zero measure.
Proof of Proposition 2. We will organize the proof in several steps.
Step 1. Prove that pb(N ) and pnb(N) are decreasing functions of N and
pb(N) > pnb(N ) for all N < N b:
Solving (12) for N we obtain
N = 1 + [(1¡ F (P ))=f (P )¡ (1¡ ®)P ] = [P ¡ ®G(P )] (21)
which is a decreasing function of P . Consequently, the inverse function
pb(N) is also decreasing. Since pb(1) = pmb > p¤ and pb(1) = 0; there
exists a unique solution to pb(N) = p¤: Similarly, (13) implies N = (1 ¡
F (P ))= [(P ¡ c)f(P )] which is a decreasing function. Since pnb(0) = 1 > p¤
and pb(1) = c < p¤ there exists a unique solution to pnb(N ) = p¤:
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For all N < N b; we have pb(N) > p¤ and therefore ®G(pnb(N)) > c:
Using (12) and (13) for every N holds
1
N
=
(pnb ¡ c)f(pnb)
1¡ F (pnb) =
(pb ¡ c)f(pb)
1¡ F (pb) ¡
f (pb)[(®G(pb)¡ c) + ®
N
(pb ¡G(pb))]
1¡ F (pb)
which implies pnb(N) > pb(N ):
Step 2. Prove that N b > Nnb:
This follows from Step 1. Indeed, both pnb(N) and pb(N) are continu-
ous decreasing functions, pnb(N ) < pb(N ) for all N < N b and pnb(Nnb) =
pb(N b) = p¤:
Step 3. Existence of equilibria.
The barter equilibrium exists if and only if pb(N b) ¸ p¤ i.e. N · N b: The
no-barter equilibrium exists if and only if pnb(Nnb) · p¤ i.e. N ¸ Nnb: The
rationed barter equilibrium exists if and only if both barter and no-barter
equilibria exist.
Step 4. Stability of equilibria.
Barter equilibrium at N < N b and no-barter equilibrium at N > Nnb
are stable. Indeed if there is no barter and one seller deviates by o¤ering a
positive amount of barter sales, other sellers have no incentives to deviate. If,
in a barter equilibrium, one seller deviates by o¤ering less barter then other
sellers’s best response is to capture the unattended customers and therefore
restore total barter sales equal to F (P ):
The rationed barter equilibrium is unstable. Indeed, if one seller chooses
to sell a little more for barter and a little less for cash, the price in the cash
market will increase which would make average quality of payments in kind
®G(P ) greater than marginal cost of production c. Then all other sellers will
want to sell for barter and the barter equilibrium will be reached. Similarly,
if one seller decides to deviate from rationed barter equilibrium selling more
for cash and less for barter, ®G(P ) will fall below c and everyone will give
up selling for barter so that the no-barter equilibrium will be reached.
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